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NOTE
BIOETHICS CONSULTANTS:
CORPORATE RELIANCE ON A NEW
FIELD OF CONSULTATION
Kevin Schadickt
I. INTRODUCTION
The technological advances made within the last several decades
have given rise to myriad pharmaceutical and biotechnology compa-
nies competing for a stake in the market. The quest for knowledge
and market forces driving the advancement of scientific research to
develop cures, tests, and therapies for disease creates an inherent
problem. Government regulation cannot keep up with the advance-
ment of science.1 The result is the potential for a decrease in both the
safety of subjects participating in clinical trials and in the availability
of federal oversight of ethical research endeavors.
Many of the institutional guidelines and regulations governing
oversight of scientific research exist under the auspices of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH), 2 the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (DHHS), and the Food and Drug Administration
I Kevin Schadick, J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law(2005).
1 See Michael J. Malinowski & Robin J.R. Blatt, Commercialization of
Genetic Testing Services: The FDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71
TuL. L. REV. 1211, 1222 (1997) (stating that the regulations are being developed to
respond to technology rather than in anticipation of its development). See also Chris
MacDonald, Stem Cell Ethics and the Forgotten Corporate Context, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Feb. 2002, at 55 (stating that when "scientific advancement is rapid, legis-
lation will always lag").
2 E.g., Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the
Regulation of Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 205-11 (1987) (discussing
the internal guidelines of the NIH on biotechnology); See also Sharona Hoffman,
Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy, and IRBs, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 71, 75 (2003) (noting the historic role of the NIH in regulating biomedical re-
search).
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(FDA).3  These agencies are designed to regulate federally funded
research, and in the case of the FDA, research of drugs, devices, and
biological products that will ultimately be available in the consumer
market.4 However, many biotechnology companies and clinical trials
receive their funding privately and therefore do not fall under the
regulatory umbrella of the DHHS. In an increasing number of cases,
biotechnology companies are creating genetic tests for diseases that
circumvent FDA regulations by administering such tests in the devel-
oper's facilities.5 The developer thus administers the test directly or
through a primary care physician and never sells the individual com-
ponents and reagents (chemicals) comprising the test as a kit.6 Al-
though the developer can now commercially market the genetic test,
circumvention of federal regulations is possible using the label, "for
investigational purposes only," because a lack in regulation exists
pertaining to genetic tests.7
Genetic testing is not the only research that is capable of remain-
ing unregulated. Although hotly debated among scholars, politicians,
and the public as a whole, methods of therapeutic cloning are largely
unregulated. In recent years, the FDA proposed to enforce regulations
in the same manner in which it approaches unapproved drugs; by re-
quiring a research proposal subject to authorization by an Institutional
Review Board (IRB) and to require informed consent from all human
research subjects.8 However, many members of Congress, as well as
legal scholars throughout the country, question whether the FDA can
extend its power this far to regulate. 9 The result is the ability of pri-
vately funded biotechnology companies and scientists to perform
therapeutic cloning experiments and similar research absent regula-
tions requiring protection for human subjects.
The concern regarding a lack of regulation within the biotechnol-
ogy community does not remain unnoticed within Congress. In 2002,
Congress proposed the Human Research Subjects Protections Act of
2002, which sought to extend prior review requirements to all human
3 See generally, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2004) (providing DHHS protection of
human research subjects); 21 C.F.R. § 56.101 (2004) (defining the scope of institu-
tional review boards under the FDA).
4 45 C.F.R. § 46.101; 21 C.F.R. § 56.101.
5 See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1228-30.
6 Id.
I d. at 1230-31 & n.64.
8 See generally Rebecca Dresser, Human Cloning and the FDA, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., May-June 2003, at 7 (presenting the debate over whether the FDA
possesses the authority to regulate human cloning).
9 Id. at 7.
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subjects research regardless of the source of funding.' ° If enacted, the
regulation would effectively require all research to undergo the same
review process required of federally funded research. The bill has yet
to pass, but the call for government action remains. One such call
came from Ronald Cole-Turner of the Pittsburgh Theological Society,
who proposed that the President's Bioethics Council be "given federal
oversight responsibilities over privately funded research as well as
publicly funded research.""
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies appreciate the need
for ethical responsibility and, with ever-increasing frequency, are cre-
ating private bioethics committees or utilizing bioethics consultants to
establish protocols and review ongoing research.12 In so doing, indus-
try representatives hope that government intervention will remain
dormant, allowing private researchers to self-regulate and establish
their own policies.' 3 Industry would prefer to follow in the footsteps
of government by allowing the guidelines and regulations that govern
federally funded human subjects research to serve as an ethical stan-
dard for industry to incorporate as internal policies.14 Yet, corporate
science relies heavily on secrecy to secure a competitive advantage,
making industry-wide scrutiny of ethical research protocols and poli-
cies a difficult endeavor.' 5 The question remains whether it is possi-
ble for corporate biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to
create their own self-policing system of ethics oversight without gov-
ernment intervention in the form of regulation.
This Note examines the emerging phenomenon of corporate bio-
ethics consultants and committees created to ensure ethical review of
research proposals. Increasing numbers of research abuses are surfac-
ing, ranging from the death of Jesse Gelsinger,' 6 a gene-therapy re-
search subject, to the recent disregard of federal regulations at Johns
0 H.R. 4697, 107th Cong. (2002).
" Margot Patterson, Small Step, Big Fuss: Cloning Experiment Highlights
Need for Public Oversight, NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 7, 2001, at 3 (discussing the
debate for public oversight for all human cloning research).
12 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bioethicists Find Themselves The Ones
Being Scrutinized, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 2, 2001, at A l (describing the recent growth in
bioethics consultation in science).
13 See John Miller, Note, Beyond Biotechnology: FDA Regulation of
Nanomedicine, 4 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 5 (April 23, 2002), at
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=4&article=5 (discussing the problems expected
with regulating nanotechnology based on attempts to regulate biotechnology).
14 See Bernard J. Ficarra, BIOETHICS' RISE, DECLINE, AND FALL 149 (2002).
15 See id.
16 E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Biomedicine is Receiving New Scrutiny as
Scientists Become Entrepreneurs, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at A26.
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Hopkins in the death of Ellen Roche.17 Tragedies such as these repre-
sent failure at some level in the system and raise the question of
whether bioethics consultants are competent to provide advice,
whether this advice is taken, and what additional roles or functions a
corporate bioethicist has within a corporation. Part II of this Note
examines the position and qualifications of a corporate bioethics con-
sultant or member of a corporate bioethics committee. This section
will examine whether bioethicists should obtain a standardized license
before providing consultation on human subjects research or other
biotechnological endeavors. Part III discusses the problems of com-
pensation and conflicts of interest that are prevalent when ethicists
provide consultations for corporate biotechnology. Part IV analyzes
corporate reliance on the advice of paid consultants, bioethicists' abil-
ity to speak out against a biotechnology corporation, and disclosure
problems that result. Finally, Part V offers recommendations that
might ensure adequate ethical oversight of corporate science.
II. RESPONSIBILITIES AND EXPERIENCE OF
BIOETHICS CONSULTANTS
A. Bioethics Consultants
The rapid emergence of bioethics over the last several decades
and the realization of its importance within both the academic and
industrial communities'8 created a boom in the number of individuals
providing advice as a corporate bioethics consultant or a member of a
corporate bioethics committee. Corporate bioethics consultants or
committees possess no decision-making authority; and their employ-
ment does not include approving research or conducting ongoing re-
view of clinical trials. Instead, their role is primarily preliminary and
advisory. The four-fold function of a bioethics consultant is to (1)
provide independent and informed advice for ethically questionable
research proposals; 19 (2) review and develop research protocols and
informed consent documents that will withstand review of an aca-
demic Institutional Review Board; (3) provide commentary and ex-
17 E.g., Sarah Ramsay, Johns Hopkins Takes Responsibility for Volunteer's
Death, 358 LANCET 213 (2001); Lori A. Alvino, Note, Who's Watching the Watch-
dogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 893, 893-94 (2003).
18 M. L. Tina Stevens, BIOETHICS IN AMERICA: ORIGINS AND CULTURAL
POLITICS 12-13 (2000).
19 See, e.g., ADVANCED CELL TECHNOLOGY, ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, at
http://www.advancedcell.com/eab.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
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planations to the public of research performed; and in some cases (4)
to provide education to employees of the corporation.
20
Currently no definitive guidelines exist as to what qualifies indi-
viduals to claim that they are bioethicists. So then, what defines a
bioethicist and what are the backgrounds of the members of the bio-
ethics advisory committees at companies such as Advanced Cell
Technology and Geron Corporation? Corporate bioethics advisory
committees utilize an approach similar to IRBs and ethics committees
by creating a board of individuals with various backgrounds, not all
within bioethics. 2' For example, the members of the ethics advisory
board at Advanced Cell Technology have backgrounds in bioethics,
theology, genetics, philosophy, law, and reproductive biology.22 Re-
lying on this IRB framework for selecting members of a corporate
bioethics committee may not be adequate. A Maryland study has ac-
tually shown that most members (approximately sixty-two percent) of
ethics committees do not possess a bioethics background or appropri-
ate ethics coursework.23 Continuing education for members of IRBs
and ethics committees is one way currently used to combat this lack of
bioethics knowledge in the academic and hospital setting.24 Presuma-
bly, corporations would not face this problem because they would
select independent bioethics consultants or members of corporate bio-
ethics committees who would already possess the requisite knowledge
and experience before being selected to consult. Yet, a system does
not exist to ensure that individuals claiming to be bioethicists possess
the adequate training.
The popularity of bioethics has given rise to numerous bioethics
departments and programs at universities throughout the country,25 but
20 E.g. Baruch Brody et al., Bioethics Consultation in the Private Sector,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2002, at 14, 15; Ronald M. Green et al., Oversee-
ing Research on Therapeutic Cloning: A Private Ethics Board Responds to Its Critics,
HASTINGS CENTER REP. May-June 2002, at 27, 29 (describing the role of the Ad-
vanced Cell Technology Ethics Advisory Board).
21 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a) (2004) (requiring the membership of an IRB to
consist of at least five individuals possessing diverse backgrounds, expertise, race,
and gender.).
22 Ronald M. Green et al., Advanced Cell Technology, Statement by the Eth-
ics Advisory Board of Advanced Cell Technology, June 2, 2002, available at
http://www.advancedcell.com/2002-06-02-2.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
23 Diane Hoffmann et al., Are Ethics Committee Members Competent to
Consult?, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHics 30, 34 (2000) (stating that only 73 (38%) of the 192
responding ethics committee members had received some formal bioethics education
and only 8.8% of the committees required an education in bioethics).
24 Id.
25 Currently there are over sixty graduate bioethics departments in the coun-
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what does this training consist of and are there standards that should
be followed? Many of the graduate programs around the country of-
fer a Master's degree in Bioethics, 26 but this alone does not seem suf-
ficient to be providing advice to corporations in matters that involve
the safety of human research subjects. In fact, David Magnus, the
director of the University of Pennsylvania's Bioethics program, states
that the degree "'is not designed to be sufficient training for job
placement."' 27 Further, students should be careful to "not enter a bio-
ethics program with the dream of coming out a card-carrying 'bioethi-
cist'.''28 Instead, stringent requirements such as clinical training pro-
grams and administration of standardized exams should exist to en-
sure rigorous standards of academic bioethics programs.
Clinical training programs are beginning to emerge within aca-
demic bioethics programs. 29 The Department of Clinical Bioethics at
the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center of the NIH reevaluated its
programs, instituted changes and developed new ones.30 In revamping
its educational program, the NIH created two major educational com-
ponents: (1) training bioethics fellows and (2) training non-
bioethicists in bioethics issues.3' The fellowship is a two-year pro-
gram that combines a year-long bioethics seminar on fundamental
issues in bioethics, an intensive course in clinical research, attendance
and participation in one of the thirteen NIH IRBs, and clinical ethics
consultations.32 In addition, fellows are expected to research a spe-
cific bioethics issue with the goal of producing two to four publica-
tions prior to the end of the fellowship.33 The rise in the intensity and
scope of the program to not only include theoretical scholarship but
also practical experience will hopefully give rise to a more well-
try and several more worldwide. For a listing of some of the programs and links to
their websites, see http://www.bioethics.net/beginners/gradprogram.php (last visited
Apr. 4, 2005).
26 Information about individual degree programs can be obtained by reading
the descriptions under the university Internet links that are available at
http://www.bioethics.netibeginners/gradprogram.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
27 See Dominic A. Sisti, There He Is... Master of Bioethics, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Nov. 1, 2002, at 28, 29 (citation omitted).
28 Id.
29 For information on programs requiring a clinical training component, see
supra note 26.
30 See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Blossoming of Bioethics at NIH, 8
KENNEDY INST. ETHics J. 455 (1998).
31 Id. at 460.
32 Id. at 460-61.
" ld. at 461.
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rounded education and ability to garner the skills needed to compe-
tently provide advice.
B. Professional Standards
The biggest problem within bioethics, according to R. Alta Charo,
a University of Wisconsin law and medical ethics professor, is that
"anybody can stand up and claim to be an ethicist - there is no licens-
ing, there is no accreditation." 34 Licensing and registration standards
exist in many occupations such as medicine, law, psychiatry, invest-
ment banking, and education.35 These standards often consist of ful-
filling a required curriculum and subsequently passing a standardized
exam.36 States possess the power to set their own regulations,37 but
significant similarities are present between such regulations, to ensure
that licensing requirements are closely aligned across the nation.
The question remains whether it is possible to propose the crea-
tion of regulations or licensing requirements to ensure that bioethicists
are competent to be providing advice that ultimately could affect the
well-being of a human research participant. This is a difficult propo-
sition because ethicists and the public as a whole could reject this pro-
posal on the basis that any individual with a modicum of common
sense possesses the capability to administer advice. Yet, when human
lives are at stake, should there not be some standard? The following
three examples illustrate the argument that a requirement for registra-
tion and/or licensing of bioethics consultants is feasible.
1. Teachers
Individuals seeking teaching positions at public and private
schools must obtain a license to ensure that children receive a quality
education. 38 Each individual state has its own Department of Educa-
tion that requires a teaching certificate or endorsement that states that
an individual has successfully fulfilled the necessary requirements to
34 See Stolberg, supra note 12, at A16.
35 See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (stating that states
have an interest in establishing regulations or licensure requirements for a variety of
professions).
36 See Miller v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 658 N.E.2d 523, 531 (111. App.
Ct. 1995) (holding that requirement of licensing examination for profession engineers
is not a violation of equal protection).
17 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792 (rationalizing this power as a means to "protect
the public health, safety, and other valid interests").
38 See, e.g., Ohio Dep't of Educ., Mission Statement, at
http://www.ode.state.oh.us/teaching-profession/teacher/certification-licensure (last
visited Apr. 4, 2005) (outlining the goals of licensure).
20051
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become a public school teacher. In Ohio, individuals seeking to teach
in elementary school must first receive a provisional license, valid for
two years, by successfully completing a minimum of twelve semester
hours in education. 39 The provisional license then leads to a second
license requiring a performance-based standardized test administered
by the Ohio Department of Education. ° In contrast, Massachusetts
has similar but more stringent criteria. Massachusetts requires an
applicant to possess a bachelor's degree and pass both a Communica-
tion and Literacy Skills test and a subject matter test appropriate for
the particular license sought.41
2. Stockbrokers
Stockbrokers are an example of an occupation for which the fed-
eral government requires licensing and registration. Under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,42 the federal government made it unlawful
for any broker to participate in an interstate commercial transaction of
any securities unless that broker is registered.43 Registration requires
filing an application with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and fulfilling the informational and documentary re-
quirements.44
Although the federal government mandates the general action of
registration, states may also choose to exercise authority by legislating
additional requirements.45 The federal government maintains in the
Securities Exchange Act that brokers or salespersons must meet requi-
site standards to protect investors, 46 as well as pass exams 47 designed
in congruence with national associations and securities exchanges.48
39 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3301-24-05 (2004) (provisional license guidelines).
See also, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.24 (Anderson 2004) (minimum education
requirements).
40 OHIO ADMrN. CODE § 3301-24-04 (2004).
41 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603 § 7.04 (2003) (requirements and types of
teacher licenses).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
43 § 78o(a)(1).
44 § 78o(b)(1).
45 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.14-1707.19 (2003) (making
it unlawful to deal securities without a license and proscribing all of the requirements
for obtaining and maintaining a license). See also, OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:6-3-15
(2003) (describing Ohio's requirements for registration of securities dealers).
46 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (requiring "standards of training, experience, com-
petence, and such other qualifications as the Commission finds necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.").
47 78o(b)(7)(B) (requiring dealers "to pass tests prescribed in accordance
with [federal] rules and regulations").
48 78o(b)(7)(C) (stating that "[t]he Commission may cooperate with regis-
440 [Vol. 15:433
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While the federal government requires brokers to pass an exam in
general, the states possess the power to regulate specifically which
exams to take.49 Most states require brokers to pass the General Secu-
rities Registered Representative Examination (commonly referred to
as Series 7). In addition, many states require a second examination,
the Uniform Securities Agents State Law Examination (Series 63)5 l
3. Investment Advisers
The final example most closely related to providing advice similar
to that given by bioethics consultants is the occupation of investment
advisers. An investment adviser is a "person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others ... as to the value of secu-
rities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities. ''52 Certain individuals may be excepted from this definition
of an investment adviser, such as if a banker, attorney, accountant, or
other individual incidentally provides advice in addition to the duties
of their chosen profession. 53 The federal government found that in-
vestment advisers were of "national concern" since their advice re-
lates to securities traded over the national securities exchange and
often takes place through interstate commerce.5 4 Congress thus en-
acted the "Investment Advisers Act of 1940."" 5
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it is unlawful to
"make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce . . . as an investment adviser" unless registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.56 If an investment adviser's
tered securities associations and national securities exchanges in devising and admin-
istering tests"). The major association responsible for designing and administering
these exams is the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). The
NASD is a private, not-for-profit organization given self-regulatory powers by the
federal government with the purpose of governing securities firms and ensuring in-
vestor confidence in the financial markets. NAT'L ASS'N OF SECS. DEALERS, NASD
CORPORATE DESCRIPTION, at http://www.nasd.com/corp-info/corpdescription.asp
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
49 See, e.g., OHIO ADMrN. CODE § 1301:6-3-15 (2003) (providing information
on specific exams).
50 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2004-05
ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos122.htm (last modified May 18, 2004).
51 id.
52 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2000).
51 See id.
14 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (Congressional findings with regard to investment
advisers).
" Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763-A (1940) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 80b (2000)).
56 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (discussing registration of investment advisers).
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clients all reside within a single state, there is no requirement for fed-
eral registration,57 yet a licensing or registration requirement might
still exist in the individual state.58  Hence, the federal government
gives deference to the states to determine their own registration and
licensing requirements unless the investment adviser fulfills the crite-
ria for federal registration.5 9
Under the federal provisions, investment advisers may register
with the Commission by submitting a completed application.60  The
application must consist of formal administrative information such as
name, the State of business, and number of employees. 61 More impor-
tantly though, the adviser must disclose his/her education, present
business affiliations, business affiliations over the past ten years, and
the means in which the investment adviser is compensated.62
III. COMPENSATION AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The major element distinguishing IRBs and Hospital Ethics
Committees from an Ethics Advisory Board for a biotechnology com-
pany or an independent bioethics consultant is compensation. Bio-
ethicists in the corporate world receive compensation for their time,
effort, and advice, whereas members of IRBs and ethics committees
traditionally volunteer their time.63 The disparity between academic
and corporate advisory boards has created a rift in the bioethics com-
munity. This section investigates the varying rationales behind com-
pensation for ethical advice, the problems that ensue, and the potential
remedies being considered.
A. Bioethics Consultant Compensation
The increased realization that biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies need bioethicists on staff has created a demand that facili-
51 § 80b-3(b)(1) (no registration is required as long as all clients are residents
of the state in which the adviser maintains his principal place of business and the
advisor "does not furnish advice or issue analyses or reports with respect to securities
listed or admitted to unlisted trading privileges on any national securities exchange.").
" § 80b-3a(b)(1) (requiring advisers to be subject to Commission authority).
'9 § 80b-3a(a).
60 § 80b-3(c)(1).
61 § 80b(c)(1)(A).
62 15 U.S.C. § 80b(c)(1)(B) (education and business affiliations); 15 U.S.C. §
80b(c)(1)(F) (basis of compensation).
63 Academic IRBs are more frequently accepting money from corporate
sponsors to review research protocols. See e.g. Nell Boyce, And Now, Ethics for
Sale? Bioethicists and Big Bucks. Problem City?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
30, 2001, at 18, 19 (discussing Stanford's acceptance of one million dollars from
SmithKline Beecham).
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tates varying levels of compensation. Biotechnology companies rec-
ognize the importance of staff bioethicists that stock options, gifts,
and significant consultation fees are not excluded from the realm of
compensation a bioethicist receives. 6' The range of compensation is
vast, but monetary compensation may not be the sole problem.
Money alone might not be what is driving a bioethicist to become a
corporate consultant, as "[b]ioethicists tend to be seduced by more
subtle lures than money. 65 Academics and ethicists flourish as a re-
sult of their reputation and thus, the status and honor of being a corpo-
rate consultant might be of greater appeal than monetary compensa-
tion. Status among the bioethics community could create an individ-
ual who is "in demand - sought after as the expert in the field, invited
to reflect in prestigious journals, to speak on panels, to be a member
of national boards, [and] to be invited into discourse with the me-
dia.",66 In addition, experience as a corporate bioethicist could provide
additional support for tenure and publication of academic articles for
those on faculty at universities. 67 Compensation in the form of recog-
nition and praise is neither capable of regulation nor restriction since
these intangible benefits afforded to them are non-monetary. 6' The
result is such that intangible benefits create a fundamental problem in
areas of conflict of interest and impartiality because even if no mone-
tary compensation is present, the intangible benefits add to the profit-
ability and net worth of the bioethicist. There seems to be no direct
solution to this intangible benefit problem, therefore this section will
focus on the heart of the public debate regarding the problems of
monetary compensation provided for bioethics consultations.
There are two views about the legitimacy of accepting money for
bioethics advice as it relates to the problem of conflicts of interest. A
conflict of interest occurs when an individual's ideals, opinions, or
actions could potentially lose their objectivity because of personal
interests for financial gain. 69 In bioethics, compensation for services
could cause a bioethicist to find more favorably for the corporation
providing the funds. One argument suggests that "[b]ioethicists must
64 Carl Elliott, Throwing a Bone to the Watchdog, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9 ( "Pharmaceutical and biotechnology corporations need bioethi-
cists . . .[s]o deep are their moral and spiritual needs that they are willing to give
ethicists6iifts, contracts, honoraria, consultation fees, and stock options.").
Laurie Zoloth, Seeing the Duties to All, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr,
2001, at 15, 17.
66 Id. at 17.
67 See Lisa Eckelbecker, A Question of Ethics, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 2002, at E 1.
68 Zoloth, supra note 65, at 17-18.
69 Id. at 17.
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avoid conflicts of interest and remain true to their profession's duty to
serve the 'broader good"' and therefore reject any offer for compensa-
tion.7 0 The belief appears to be that accepting money in exchange for
providing ethical advice is contrary to the nature of ethics.71 In other
words, the role of a bioethicist is to make informed decisions inde-
pendent of corporate influence. If a monetary bond forms between a
bioethicist and a corporation, then their decisions might not be on par
with representing the public good. 72 Arguably, bioethics consultants
should volunteer their time similar to members of IRBs and hospital
ethics committees. To date, only one biotechnology company, Geron,
says it uses unpaid consultants.7 3
The urgent need for bioethicists in the biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical industries warrants reasonable compensation for services.
Arguments that bioethicists should not receive compensation for their
efforts are counterintuitive, since industries seek to achieve advice
from bioethicists by expending funds to search for solutions to their
ethical problems.74  To attract and work with the best and brightest
bioethicists, some level of compensation must exist. In an ideal
world, bioethicists might volunteer their time, but at what cost? If
individuals do not receive compensation for their efforts, there is little
incentive to routinely consult.7 5 Therefore, a minimal level of com-
pensation is necessary for bioethicists providing their expertise to
corporate biotechnology to prevent bioethicists from concluding that
consultation is not worth their time and effort.
While the IRB system works without compensation and individu-
als still participate, the analogy is poor, and at best, only tangential
because the industries represented are completely different. Biotech-
nology and pharmaceuticals are driven to make large amounts of
money, whereas the goals of academic institutions and hospitals are to
70 Thomas Donaldson, The Business Ethics of Bioethics Consulting,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 12, 13 (analyzing means of rationalizing
ways in which bioethical consultants can accept money without creating conflicts of
interest).
71 See Zoloth, supra note 65, at 15.
72 See Leigh Turner, The Greening of Bioethics: Corporate Funding of Bio-
ethics Research, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 326, 327 (1998) (stating that
"alliances between bioethicists and corporations could ... serve to undermine reflec-
tive social criticism.").
73 Vicki Brower, Biotechs Embrace Bioethics, BIOSPACE.COM ONLINE
FEATURE, June 14, 1999, at http://www.biospace.com/articles/061499_print.cfrn (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005). Yet, newspaper reports state that one member of Geron's
ethical advisory board, Laurie Zoloth, receives $1000 per meeting. Stolberg, supra
note 12, at A16.
74 See Donaldson, supra note 70, at 12.
75 id.
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increase the advancement of science and protect public welfare and
safety. Hence, the individuals that participate in the IRB system
might be representing themselves or their community to ensure the
safety of human subjects in their area, and maintain a standard, repre-
sentative of their own ideals.
A second and largely supported argument is that it is acceptable
for bioethicists to receive money because ethicists are professionals
using their skills to provide professional advice.76 If one defines a
"professional" as an individual with skills and knowledge dedicated to
providing a "broader good that defines both expertise and service,"
then it is feasible that a professional bioethicist may be able to sepa-
rate the benefits of receiving compensation from generating a conflict
of interest with the responsibilities of providing sound and ethical
advice." If one is able to achieve this separation, then there is no
reason to hold that they could not remain "true to the values of [their]
profession." 78 The fear as stated previously is that without compensa-
tion, no incentive would exist to consult, and bioethicists would even-
tually stop providing bioethics advice.79 If there is acceptance that
corporations and society can consider bioethicists as business profes-
sionals, then separation of personal and financial interests from their
role as ethical advisors is imperative to assure that they meet the needs
of the client's interests.80 Failure to separate such interests under-
mines the social good and protection of the public welfare that corpo-
rations and bioethicists purport this relationship is meant to achieve.
Bioethics consultants receive varying amounts of compensation
for their work. Some bioethicists such as Ron Green, a theology pro-
fessor and member of the Ethics Advisory Board at Advanced Cell
Technology, choose to receive a compensation package that he be-
lieves to be de minimus and consists of a $200 stipend per meeting
81similar to the compensation that grant reviewers for the NIH receive.
In addition to this stipend, the members of this board receive travel
expenses, but do not receive any compensation for time spent beyond
the quarterly meetings. 82 This stipend tends to be at the low end of the
spectrum of payments to ethics advisors according to Green.83 Laurie
Zoloth, chairwoman of the Geron ethics board believes she also re-
76 Id. at 13.
77 id.
78 id.
71 Id. at 12.
80 Id. at 13.
81 Green et al., supra note 20, at 29.
82 Id. at 28-29.
81 Id. at 29
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ceives a de minimus fee, albeit $1000 per meeting.84 Considering that
many bioethicists are willing to donate their time to advisory boards
under the belief that their occupation is meant to serve the greater
good, $1000 per meeting seems far from de minimus.
Other bioethicists such as Arthur Caplan, a bioethicist from the
University of Pennsylvania, believe corporate money should be abun-
dantly circulating and have no qualms about receiving huge salaries or
even stock options.85 This view that money needs to be more abun-
dant in the bioethics community is because the amount of advice and
the importance that biotechnology is placing on ethics should force
them to realize that this is an investment in a worthwhile endeavor.86
In addition to any consultation fees that Caplan receives from corpora-
tions, he also receives compensation in the form of stock options from
Celera Genomics that he reportedly sells, passing the proceeds over to
the University of Pennsylvania Bioethics Research Center.87 It has
been reported that one year, the stock was worth $100,000.88 Con-
flicting reports however, suggest that Caplan does not receive pay-
ment from corporations and in fact, Caplan states that, "'I can be more
outspoken if I'm not on the payroll.'
' 89
Several examples describe bioethicists who are capitalizing on the
availability of corporate compensation and the industry need for ethi-
cal advice. Janssen Pharmaceuticals pays its bioethics consultant,
Evan DeRenzo, on an hourly basis to sit in on meetings, develop cor-
porate policies, review research protocols and provide educational
sessions. 90 DeRenzo is a staff member at the Center for Ethics at the
Washington Hospital Center and feels that the argument that accept-
ing compensation reduces impartiality and objectivity is nothing more
than a "myth." 91 A second example is "The Ethics Guy," Bruce
Weinstein. Once a faculty member in the bioethics department at
West Virginia University, Weinstein now provides ethical advice in
84 Stolberg, supra note 12, at A16.
85 See Boyce, supra note 63, at 18-19.
86 Email from Arthur Caplan, Ph.D., Director, Center for Bioethics, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, to Kevin Schadick, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law (Feb. 28, 2004, 17:29:04 EST) (on file with author).
87 Stolberg, supra note 12, at A16.
88 Id.
89 Brower, supra note 73 (stating further that Caplan does not receive pay-
ment from Celera Genomics and donates the honoraria he receives to an independent
foundation).
90 Carl Elliott, Pharma Buys a Conscience, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2001, at
16, 19.
91 Id. at 19-20.
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the form of lectures and seminars to a wide range of businesses, for
which he is generously paid.92
Finally, the newest incarnation of advice providers has emerged
through the Internet at Foreview.com. 93 Foreview hires ethicists and
advisors to provide businesses with expert opinions and advice.94
According to Carl Elliott, participating ethicists receive $175 per
question answered initially and, with more experience, the ethicists
are assigned more extensive consulting projects for which they set
their own rates.95 Foreview takes a ten percent finder's fee, capped at
a maximum of $5,000.96
B. Institutional Compensation
The compensation problem is not isolated solely to individual
bioethicists. Academic bioethics centers are now receiving generous
grants from biotechnology and pharmaceutical corporations for their
role in researching controversial ethics questions.97 In 2000, the
Midwest Bioethics Center announced that Aventis Pharmaceuticals
funded a new $587,000 initiative.98 Likewise, the Merck Company
Foundation funded several international ethics centers around the
world.99 Universities such as the University of Pennsylvania and
Stanford are well-known for their lucrative affiliations with biotech-
nology and pharmaceutical corporations.'00
Non-profit and university corporate sponsorships do not come
without a price, however. In 2000, the first reported case of a corpo-
ration cutting a bioethics center's funding occurred when Eli Lilly
rescinded its $25,000 annual grant to the Hastings Center.' 10 The
Hastings Center publishes the well-known journal, the Hastings Cen-
ter Report. One issue of the journal dedicated itself to a discussion of
antidepressants such as Prozac.102 One of the articles contained within
92 Id. at 19. Information on the services provided by Bruce Weinstein is
available at his website, http://www.theethicsguy.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
93 Elliott, supra note 90, at 19. For a full description of the services avail-
able, see http://www.foreview.com. (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
94 Elliott, supra note 90, at 19.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 E.g. id. at 16.
98 Id. at 17.
99 Id.
100 See id.; Boyce, supra note 63, at 19; Press Release, Center for Science in
the Public Interest, CSPI Calls for Prevention and Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest
in Bioethics (June 11, 2002), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/
bioethics 061102.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).10T Elliott, supra note 90, at 17.
102 Symposium, Prozac, Alienation, and the Self, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
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the issue strongly criticized Prozac, Eli Lilly's flagship product. 10 3 As
a result of the editor's decision to publish the article, Eli Lilly pulled
the Hastings Center's funding. 0 4 Yet, the function of the Hastings
Center and its journal is to produce unbiased work that embraces both
sides of ethical debates and to inform the public that such issues ex-
i~.105ist. °
The dilemma illustrated by the Hastings Center's loss of funding
is the fundamental problem associated with conflicts of interest. How
does one maintain harmony between the funding source and what is
ethically correct? Additionally, how do interested parties know which
bioethicists and what corporations have partnerships? Currently, nei-
ther regulations nor standards require disclosure of compensation re-
ceived by bioethicists or their institutions. The highly debated ques-
tion among bioethicists is how much disclosure is sufficient and
where should this disclosure occur? As this is an important issue,
many articles attempt to provide answers and solutions to this debate.
The next section will include an analysis of disclosure proposals de-
veloped by various bioethicists when corporate consultants publish
articles about controversial science or speak out against their clients.
IV. CORPORATE RELIANCE, THE RIGHT TO SPEAK
OUT, AND DISCLOSURE
The role of a bioethics consultant is to advise biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies how to handle ethical issues with their
scientific research, and how to proceed to ensure the protection of
human research subjects. As with all business consultations, corpora-
tions may choose whether or not to heed that advice. 0 6 This choice
follows from the facts that companies who utilize bioethics consult-
ants and advisory bodies are not ensured that they are receiving good
advice. 10 7 The inherent problems discussed in previous sections re-
garding conflicts of interest and inadequate experience might lead to
bioethicists who provide misguided advice. Therefore, corporate enti-
ties retain the right to choose which advice to follow or discard.
Mar.-Apr. 2000.
103 Elliott, supra note 90, at 17. The controversial article which resulted in
the loss of one of The Hastings Center's corporate sponsors is David Healy, Good
Science or Good Business?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 19.
104 Elliott, supra note 90, at 17.
105 See The Hastings Center, About the Center, available at
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/about.asp (last updated Apr. 29, 2004).
106 See, e.g., Brody et al., supra note 20, at 19.
07 Brower, supra note 73.
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Corporations that choose not to heed the advice of their consult-
ants have received heavy criticism from bioethicists who disagree
with this choice. There are two major criticisms that bioethicists put
forward. First, the freedom for a biotechnology company to select
which advice it would like to follow makes bioethicists nothing more
than "corporate window dressing" or a "rubber stamp" approval sys-
tem. 10 8 Second, bioethicists are heard only when controversial re-
search subjects need smoothing over, thus making them no more than
a public relations tool for the corporate entity to use. 109 This section
examines individually the two criticisms presenting known examples
of each. The section continues by discussing one remedy that is cur-
rently employed by bioethics consultants to ensure that they have op-
portunities to be heard if management decides not to heed their ad-
vice. Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of the problem
of disclosure when bioethicists publish and speak out about controver-
sial scientific research.
A. Corporate Window Dressing
In 1999, Jesse Gelsinger died from an experimental gene therapy
trial. 110 The trial conducted through the University of Pennsylvania
was in conjunction with one of its professors, who funded the trial in
part through proceeds from his personal start-up biotechnology com-
pany, Genovo Corporation. i ll The University of Pennsylvania con-
sulted with Dr. Arthur Caplan as its bioethics advisor to set up the
gene therapy trial to help infants with omithine transcarbamylase de-
ficiency (OTC).'1 2 The advice that Caplan provided was accurate
advice, that infants cannot be used in clinical trials, and that this gene
therapy treatment needed to first be studied on adults.1 13  Jesse
Gelsinger, diagnosed with OTC but healthy at the time, volunteered
and was selected for the gene therapy trial. Shortly after he began
participating in the trial, his health rapidly decreased, ultimately lead-
ing to his death. 
14
Jesse Gelsinger's family sued the University of Pennsylvania,
Genovo Corp., and Dr. Caplan.' 15 During this period, the University
1 08 E.g., id.; Green et al., supra note 20, at 28.
109 See Elliott, supra note 90, at 20.
10 See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger,
N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 29, 1999, §6 (Magazine), at 137 [hereinafter Biotech Death] (detail-
ing the gene therapy trial and circumstances leading to Gelsinger's death).
111 Stolberg, supra note 16, at A26.
112 Biotech Death, supra note 110, at 137.
113 id.
114 Id.
115 Complaint, Gelsinger v. Univ. of Penn. (2000), available at
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of Pennsylvania made several statements that it was not at fault, com-
plied with all of the FDA's recommendations, and had in fact received
advice from Caplan about the appropriate way to set up this trial.'
16
Caplan was dropped as a defendant from the suit, which later settled
with the University of Pennsylvania essentially admitting that it was
liable for its choices.
1 17
Although the issue of this case pertained more to the use of Jesse
Gelsinger as an inappropriate research subject rather than to incorrect
advice or failure to rely on Caplan's advice, it illustrates the point that
corporations and even universities are using bioethicists to attempt to
avoid corporate liability and accountability. Corporations are more
frequently listing on their Internet websites that they recognize their
ethical responsibility and have assembled a board of bioethicists to
analyze and advise them on issues of bioethics as they arise. 18 The
bioethicists on the board presumably are present to examine issues
objectively and with impartiality." 9 The information on corporate
websites might mislead the public, who could believe that the board
has some decision-making or veto power within management. Rather,
since they are only providing advice, the role of bioethic consultants is
really to ask the critical ethical questions and to examine where poten-
tial issues might lie should the companies proceed. 20 Critics further
contend that the role of bioethicists is to give credibility to biotech-
nology companies conducting controversial research. 12 1 As a result,
those companies who deal well in the public's eye with controversial
issues will see an increase in the market of their profits and general
support from the public.
122
http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
116 Biotech Death, supra note 110, at 137.
117 See Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the
Institutional Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV 725, 725 n.3
(2001).
118 E.g., ADVANCED CELL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 19.
119 See Boyce, supra note 63, at 18; Virginia A. Sharpe, Science, Bioethics,
and the Public Interest: On the Needfor Transparency, HASTINGS CENTER.REP., May-
June 2002, at 23 (discussing the need for bioethicists and corporations to disclose
their financial interests).
120 See, e.g., Sharpe, supra note 119.
121 Id. at 25 ("Having an ethicist on board can enhance a company's public
image, deflect criticism, or lend credibility to its actions.").
122 See Brower, supra note 73 (stating that the bioethics committee for the
Biotechnology Industry Organization advises close to 100 companies and has been
successful in showing companies how to handle controversial research endeavors).
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B. Public Relations
Public exposure to controversial research leads into the second is-
sue of a corporation's deference when accepting consultant advice;
the criticism that bioethics consultants are only tools for public rela-
tions.123  The ethics boards from both Geron and Advanced Cell
Technology can be perceived as exemplifying this issue. In the case
of Geron, the corporation sought the advice of both its ethics board
and the bioethics committee from the Biotechnology Industry Organi-
zation (BIO) to determine a strategy to handle public relations issues
pertaining to the upcoming publication of two of its stem cell stud-
ies.124 According to Carl Feldbaum, head of BIO, the announcement
of Geron's research "'was very well-received"' and a "'textbook case
of how it should be done.' ' 1 25 But what exactly did the ethics board
do to help Geron with their ethical responsibilities? In this case, no
information is available to help elucidate this question.
In another example, the Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) of Ad-
vanced Cell Technology played a similar role in defending reports that
the company was performing controversial human therapeutic cloning
research.126 Unlike the Geron ethics board, the EAB released a state-
ment in June 2002 that it supported the ongoing research at Advanced
Cell Technology and its role had been to recommend strict guidelines
to management on appropriate strategies for conducting human em-
bryo research.127 In addition, although it supported the research, it
stated that the research "should never be done in humans." 28 Critics
argue that the EAB is playing an "activist role in arguing for what
[Advanced Cell Technology] is doing," yet the members of the board
contend that their advice has made a significant impact on the way
Advanced Cell Technology performs its research.
29
C. The Right to Speak Out
Bioethicists seeking to disprove the criticism that they are nothing
more than public relations tools and corporate window dressing are
123 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 90, at 20 (stating that "[n]o matter how outra-
geous a corporate policy, no matter how troubling a headline in the morning paper, it
will be softened by the knowledge that the corporation in question has consulted with
a team of ethics experts.").
124 Brower, supra note 73.
125 id.
126 GREEN ET AL., supra note 22.
127 Id.
128 Eckelbecker, supra note 67, at El.
129 Green et al., supra note 20, at 27.
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instituting policies to ensure that their opinions will not go unheard.1
30
Although biotechnology companies require bioethics consultants to
sign confidentiality agreements, bioethicists are now contracting to
possess a right to speak out, or the "power of the pen." 131 The "power
of the pen" provision allows bioethicists to write articles or make pub-
lic statements about the ethical issues involved with specific biotech-
nology so long as they do not disclose any confidential and proprie-
tary corporate information. 132 This allows bioethicists to maintain
some form of independence without subjecting themselves to a situa-
tion where they represent a biotechnology company that decides not to
heed their advice.133 The members of the EAB at Advanced Cell
Technology stated that the willingness of management to allow this
provision gave them sufficient confidence that they would not be used
as corporate window dressing.
134
D. Disclosure
With the infusion of bioethicists into the biotechnology industry,
an increase in commentary and published journal articles is emerging
within the field. Bioethicists are criticizing the works and contacts of
their colleagues without disclosing their own conflicts of interests.
Additionally, bioethicists with the "power of the pen," or those com-
menting in favor of a biotechnology company, are also not revealing
financial interests. The lack of disclosure of conflicts of interest pre-
sents a serious issue that could potentially "undermine the credibility
of [bioethics] scholarship.' 35
The authority that a bioethicist possesses is dependent upon the
public perception of the individual "providing social commentary and
normative analysis not allied to corporate concerns."' 36 One concern
of bioethicists should be to maintain credibility of and within their
field. 137 With the increase in corporate funding and a lack of adequate
disclosure, the perception of the public that bioethicists are working to
further a "greater good" will begin to falter and could eventually be
eliminated in the eyes of a distrusting public. Regardless of disclo-
130 See, e.g., id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 E.g., id.; ADVANCED CELL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 19 (noting that the
company's Ethics Advisory Board is autonomous and have no financial interest in the
company).
134 Green et al., supra note 20, at 29
135 Turner, supra note 72, at 327.
136 id.
137 Id. at 328.
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sure, however, those that encounter bioethics consultants will be left
to decide on their own whether or not they feel that "bioethicists [are]
motivated to reach their conclusions by careful deliberation rather
than the promise of financial gain."'
38
The first step to address the conflicts of interest problem ought to
occur through bioethics journals requiring disclosure of conflicts of
interests from their authors. 139 Journals are a starting point because
evidence from scientific research demonstrates that financial ties in-
fluence scientists to either exaggerate or downplay the potential harm
of a manufactured product.140 The potential for bioethicists to exhibit
similar influence as the result of highly paid consultation fees is
likely.
The call for disclosure within journal articles varies. Some bio-
ethicists feel it sufficient to mention that they simply perform consul-
tations for various corporations without listing specifics, 141 whereas
others feel that full disclosure of all specific financial ties is necessary
to adequately inform the public. 142 There is also an additional debate
over whether bioethicists need to repeatedly disclose their financial
conflicts of interest in all situations or merely whenever they are
commenting on the "research or products of a particular client."'
141
The editor of the Hastings Center Report, which published these con-
flicting viewpoints, responded by stating that individual journals may
choose how much disclosure is necessary for a particular article.'
44
Furthermore, journals must look to the subject of the article to deter-
mine whether a fully detailed disclosure is necessary or whether it is
sufficient to merely mention that the author performs corporate con-
sultations. 145
In a similar situation applicable as a potential solution to this de-
bate, a review in the New England Journal of Medicine recently set
forth suggested guidelines for scientific authors to prevent financial
incentives from generating corporate influence. 146 The two-fold solu-
' Id. at 327.
139 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 64, at 11; Stuart J. Youngner and Robert Ar-
nold, Who Will Watch the Watchers?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2002, at 21.
140 See Sharpe, supra note 119, at 23-26.
141 See Brody et al., supra note 20, at 15.
142 Youngner & Arnold, supra note 139, at 21.
143 Baruch Brody et al., The Task Force Responds, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May-June 2002, at 22, 23 [hereinafter Task Force] (responding to Youngner's accusa-
tions that the Task Force did not follow the guidelines it proposed within their arti-
cle).
144 Gregory E. Kaebnick, Difficulties with Disclosure, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., May-June 2002, at 3.
145 id.
146 See Zoloth, supra note 65, at 16.
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tion consists of disclosing all financial relationships and limiting those
relationships to "de minimus levels."' 147 Unfortunately, "[m]ost bio-
ethics journals do not even require conflict-of-interest disclosures.
And even when a financial relationship is disclosed, the amount of
money that has changed hands [has] not [been disclosed]."' 148 This
view has begun to change recently and journals such as Nature, Sci-
ence, and the Hastings Center Report are requiring disclosure of fi-
nancial ties from their contributors. 149 One final proposal for journal
disclosure requirements consists of transparency with regards to
sources of funding for the published topic; author's financial relation-
ships with other companies and associations that could benefit or be
harmed as a result of the publication; and the specific contributions of
each author to the published work.
150
In addition to individual disclosure within journal publications,
there has been a call for bioethics centers, many of which do not re-
lease their financial information to the public, to increase their disclo-
sure of financial ties of the center itself and those bioethicists in resi-
dence. 15 1 This proposal consists of setting a policy such that a bio-
ethics center should provide through its website or annual statements a
"clear statement[] on external funding and consultancy; the types of
affiliation that are unacceptable; and procedures for conflict-of-
interest management."' 52 Finally, centers should make funding in-
formation of faculty, other staff, and any other relevant information
available for full public disclosure on their website.
53
While disclosure is often good, some believe that it can be "not
only unnecessary but destructive.' 54 The rationale for this viewpoint
is that there are a limited number of scenarios when disclosure is re-
quired, but in other situations disclosure can be harmful. 5 5 One sce-
nario where disclosure is necessary occurs when a bioethicist is pre-
sented as an expert in support of a topic that the public is unable to
147 Id.
148 See Elliott, supra note 90.
149 See Zenit, Corporate Bioethicists: Watchdogs . . . Or Show Dogs?,
CuLTuRE LIFE FOUND. & INST., Aug. 4, 2001, at http://www.christianity.com (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005).
150 Sharpe, supra note 119, at 25-26.
151 E.g., Letter from Virginia A. Sharpe, Ph.D., to Colleagues of the Center
for Science in the Public Interest (June 7, 2002), available at http://www.cspinet.org/
new/pdf/letter to bioethics orgs.pdf.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Lynn A. Jansen & Daniel P. Sulmasy, Bioethics, Conflicts of Interest, and
the Limits of Transparency, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 2003, at 40, 40.
"' E.g., id. at 41.
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critically analyze or evaluate.1 56 Therefore, the expert's conclusions
must be taken as authoritative. To combat excessive reliance on the
bioethicist, disclosure of financial ties and incentives is an appropriate
mechanism to evaluate the reliability of the bioethicist.157 An exam-
ple of a situation where a bioethicist is taken as an authoritative source
occurs when a biotechnology company releases a statement of study
results endorsed by its bioethicist and the public has no access to the
actual data or research protocol.1 58 Here, the public has no choice but
to rely on the endorsement of the bioethicist that performance of the
study fits within ethical boundaries. Additionally, bioethicists often
appear on television commenting on research, and news reporters
should seek disclosure information to be made available to the view-
ing public.1 59
The alternative to the argument that disclosure is appropriate in
specific contexts is that disclosure is altogether unnecessary. Similar
to court proceedings where judges often prevent specific evidence
from being heard by the jury in fear that it might bias their opinion,
disclosure of information could also affect a reader's opinion.160 For
example, readers that are aware that an author has received corporate
funding could be biased either consciously or subconsciously to dis-
credit the arguments and claims within a specific report. 16' Thus,
there are specific situations in which disclosure is harmful. However,
looking at this argument from the alternative perspective, disclosure is
often necessary to try to avoid blind reliance by the public on the ad-
vice that a consultant gives. Therefore, it is necessary to strike a bal-
ance between when public disclosure is necessary and unnecessary.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The bioethics community, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries, and the government can take several actions to ensure that
the relationship between bioethicists and corporate entities is one that
looks towards the protection of the safety of human research subjects.
Furthermore, bioethicists and industry should have the similar goal of
maintaining that the pursuit of scientific research falls within ethical
boundaries. The focus of this Note has been to examine problems
from the perspective of the bioethicist, and therefore the following
recommendations are centered on what means could be utilized to
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 42.
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strengthen the requirements for bioethicists who wish to consult for
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies.
First, bioethicists need to achieve and prove a level of competency
to adequately reassure the public and industry that they are capable of
advising companies on controversial scientific research. The methods
employed by the states in establishing licensing requirements for edu-
cators, stockbrokers and investment advisers could provide a frame-
work for the establishment of a registration and licensing bureau for
individuals seeking to function as bioethics consultants. Registration
requirements for bioethics consultants would ensure that the public
could obtain information on bioethicists from a central location. Each
bioethicist would fill out a form stating his educational background,
practical experience, and appointments or achievements. In addition,
registration could ensure adequate education and minimize problems
such as conflicts of interest since they would require full disclosure
from the applicant.
While licensing regulations such as those for teachers and stock-
brokers would be an ideal method to begin to standardize the require-
ments of bioethics consultants, it does not have to be driven by the
state regulatory system. A private licensing bureau, similar to the
National Association of Securities Dealers,162 governed through an
association affiliated with academic universities could provide the
appropriate standardization necessary.
If one were to require licensing, the argument remains whether an
agency or standardized test can adequately tests bioethics knowledge.
The requirements set out by the licensing bureau should include an
advanced degree consisting of a minimum number of bioethics
courses. Simply having an undergraduate degree is not enough.
Since many universities now have bioethics departments, it would not
be an undue hardship to require individuals to enroll in courses spe-
cifically designed to deal with issues that one might confront in the
profession. From there it is difficult to determine what other skills
should be required for a bioethicist.163 A requirement for a specific
number of clinical training hours overseen by a faculty member is also
necessary, since such training is integral to the education of social
workers and physicians.' 64 While a standardized exam could prove
useful to test basic knowledge of ethics and the current and ever-
changing doctrines in existence, the answers to the questions would be
162 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
163 See Hoffmann et al., supra note 23, at 30-3 1.
164 For a general discussion of the residency requirement for physicians, see
Jennifer F. Whetsell, Changing the Law, Changing the Culture: Rethinking the
"Sleepy Resident" Problem, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 23 (2003).
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too subjective because individuals will wind up providing their own
ethical ideas and not those of others.' 65 Thus, the proposal for a li-
censing requirement remains limited by the ability to define the means
of applying such a system. An alternate solution might be to adopt a
registration system similar to that utilized by investment advisers. As
mentioned before, this system would not test specific knowledge, but
would allow the public to examine a bioethics consultant's back-
ground and affiliations, allowing society to reach its own conclusions.
Second, compensation should be commensurate with an industry
standard and limited to avoid the inclusion of high consultation fees,
additional gifts, stock options, or guarantees. As professionals, bio-
ethicists have a right to compensation for their work, but the level of
compensation should reflect the work and expertise required for the
position. Setting an industry standard would lessen concerns that bio-
ethicists are advising biotechnology companies for the sole reason of
the potential to receive exorbitant salaries. 166 This could help to in-
crease objectivity and independence, two growing concerns that many
bioethicists believe are being lost to those individuals who worry that
they will be replaced as consultants if they do not provide the advice
that companies want to hear. 167 Furthermore, compensation should
never be dependent on the results reached. 168 To promote independent
thought and ensure that bioethicists advise with the goal of the public
safety in mind, consultants should receive compensation regardless of
whether they provide advice the company wants to hear, or recom-
mends that the scientific research not be performed.
Third, bioethicists need to reach a consensus on disclosure re-
quirements. Many bioethicists have suggested disclosure require-
ments and the need for transparency in dealing with corporate consul-
tations, 169 yet adoption and use of these suggestions is minimal within
the bioethics community.17 Bioethicists need to disclose their finan-
cial conflicts of interests for the benefit of the public. As mentioned
in an earlier section, without disclosure, the public will not be able to
discern whether a bioethicist publishing a paper in a journal or making
a public statement criticizing controversial research is funded by a
company or foundation to express its views. 17 1 Therefore, the need
for bioethicists as well as bioethics centers to disclose their financial
165 See Hoffmann et al., supra note 23, at 37.
166 See Brody et al., supra note 20, at 15.
167 See Donaldson, supra note 70, at 13.
168 See Brody et al., supra note 20, at 18.
169 E.g., Zoloth, ,supra note 65, at 18; Sharpe, supra note 119, at 25-26.
170 See, e.g., Youngner & Arnold, supra note, 139 at 21; Task Force, supra
note 143, at 22-23.
171 See Zoloth, supra note 65, at 18.
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resources is essential to maintaining the necessary level of objectivity
so the public can feel confident relying on the advice given to clients
of bioethics consultations.
Finally, bioethicists need to continue to contract for use of the
"power of the pen." This has proven to be an effective means of pre-
venting biotechnology companies from seeking a bioethicist's advice
and failing to use it.' 72 The field of bioethics wants to avoid criticism
that portrays them solely as "corporate window dressing" or a public
relations tool. Therefore, being able to speak out against management
is an effective tool to ensure that bioethicists do not mislead the public
into thinking that they are puppets for the biotechnology industry to
use to soften news of controversial research.
VI. CONCLUSION
The intersection between bioethics and corporate science has the
potential to be a powerful alliance. The importance of biotechnology
to address the need for ethics will aid in the elimination of future ac-
cidents that never should have occurred because of ethical reasons.
Bioethicists are one key to ensuring this future, but they must create
standards and maintain their own value systems to avoid losing their
credibility in the eyes of the public they are seeking to protect. Bio-
ethicists must begin with adequate education and obtain sufficient
experience before entering the corporate world as a bioethics consult-
ant. Then, once they have entered the consulting business, they must
maintain diligence to prevent being swayed towards crafting their
advice to obtain money rather than protect the public welfare. If this
can be achieved, then the union between bioethics and biotechnology
stands a chance of maintaining credibility in an overly critical society.
172 Green et al., supra note 20, at 29.
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